

Being an energy superpower, which motivates the Globe's support for the government's decision to initiate nuclear cooperation with India, depends on being able to turn the tap off as well as on. The Indians abused our trust in 1973 in becoming the first proliferator, and we turned the nuclear cooperation tap off. They exploded more nuclear weapons in 1998, and we kept the tap off. Subsequently, nuclear-armed India and Pakistan fought over Kargil, with few nuclear safeguards in place, no physical separation at all and no second strike capability, a classic, dangerous "use'em or lose'em" scenario. That war was just a decade ago, not the Seventies. What has changed since is the deal initiated with the Indians by a discredited US president in search of a legacy and a strategic ally against Beijing, and a concomitant nuclear amnesia that denies the inherent dangers and immorality of nuclear weapons. Now Ottawa, anxious to make a buck and please a diaspora, would sell India uranium, the ready fungibility of which allows Delhi to fuel its weapons program, whatever PM Singh tells a too-willing-to-be-persuaded Ottawa. A real energy superpower would keep the tap off—in its own security interests.

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