Canada in the World, the Next Decade:

Foreign Policy in the Absence of Consensus

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Diplomatic Forum

White Horse

June 25, 2006

Check against Delivery

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Introduction

Thanks for the opportunity of speaking before such a distinguished audience. I have been asked to discuss Canada in the world in the coming decade. That would be a major research project in itself, a kind of vicarious international policy statement. I was the chief author, or at least the “lead pen”, on the last Conservative Government’s foreign policy review, entitled “Competitiveness and Security”, in 1984. I know something from that experience about the poor cost-benefit ratios of foreign policy reviews, at least from the perspective of officials. So, rather than covering the waterfront, I would like to focus on three major points that I hope you will find relevant to your understanding of Canada, and of Canada’s place in the world, some of which will suggest some possible future courses of Canadian policy over the coming decade.

I am going to argue that the world is deeply divided on crucial issues, that events are conspiring to create “perfect storms”, that our international institutions require reinforcing if we are to weather these storms. I will maintain that these problems notwithstanding there is an enormous amount of progress being made in the world, notably on poverty alleviation, health and education, although we obviously have far to go to be satisfied.

In making the overall argument, I am going to talk about:

1. Security, and the scarcity of consensus on the most important security issues
   • Whose security? What security?
   • Terrorism and the elephants in the room
   • the crucial issue of nuclear arms

2. Interdependence, including climate change and energy security

3. The “crisis” of international governance, specifically but far from exclusively at the United Nations

In the course of the presentation, I will also shamelessly insert references to the work of the Centre for International Governance Innovation where, along with Laurier University, I work.
Security and the Scarcity of Consensus

Whose security? What security?

With the end of the Cold War, international consensus about security began to evaporate. With the Iraq war, which was launched without Security Council authorization and over the objections of most of the international community, consensus on security matters receded further. Some differentiation is normal; where you stand on security depends famously on where you live. Danger and vulnerability are different if you live in Kandahar or Copenhagen, or in Nyala or Nablus, or in New York, London or Toronto.

Consider that:

• Natural disasters killed nearly 240,000 people in 2004, the vast majority in poorer countries.\(^1\)
• Small arms and light weapons killed at least 300,000 people, predominantly in the poorer countries.\(^2\)
• Intra-state conflict caused the deaths of 100’s of thousands more, notably in Africa.
• Pregnancy-related complications killed more than 500,000 women, 99% of them in the Third World.\(^3\)
• Malaria killed one million people last year, mostly in the poorest countries\(^4\), and
• HIV-AIDS killed almost three million people last year, again overwhelmingly in the Third World\(^5\).

It is not surprising in these circumstances that people in the poorer countries regard terrorism, especially terrorism directed at rich countries, as a second order concern for themselves, at best. For many of the poorer countries, the main issue is not security at all but rather development. A glance at the defence and development budgets of any developed country, let alone the most powerful country, is enough to know that the richer countries do not share that view. And this, despite the fact, as the response of Indonesians to

\(1\) ProVention
American assistance during the Tsunami shows, a dollar spent on humanitarian assistance buys more security at the margin than another dollar spent on defence.

_Terrorism_

Nor is there much international consensus on what to do about terrorism, including among “northern” countries. The UN has famously not been able to agree on a definition of terrorism. Although the General Assembly has been able to pass more than a dozen counter-terrorism conventions, and the Security Council has issued two legally binding decisions, establishing far-reaching precedents that are giving some democracies not permanently on the Security Council pause.

The US considers itself legally at war, which generates a whole train of political, military and legal consequences, including: the ongoing occupation of Iraq; incursions on the civil liberties of Americans; and the denial of the human rights of foreigners caught up in the “war”. From “extraordinary renditions” to unlawful combatant status to the abuse of prisoners to incarceration without charge or adequate process in places like Guantanamo, Abu Graib, Bagram and “black” CIA prisons abroad.

Meanwhile, most of the US’s allies and most of the rest of the world regard the “war on terror” as a metaphor, like the war on poverty. Terrorist motivations range from the political to the religious, and often seem to be some combination of the two. They include: rolling back the alien influences inherent in globalization; re-creating a theocracy; overthrowing an existing government or, at least, changing a social order they consider corrupt; creating a separate state; resisting occupation (which, depending on its methods and targets, may not be terrorism at all under international law).

_The Elephants in the Room_

The “root causes” of terrorism include the elephants in the room that many prefer not to see, especially: the fact that Middle Eastern states that do not furnish their citizens adequate possibility of self-expression through the political process, resulting in economic immobility and stagnation, in civil rights limitations and in corruption in government, which together are leading some young people to seek refuge in religion and, apparently increasingly, in religious extremism and to resent what they see as western complicity.
A second elephant is American foreign policy, and some others’, as well, which has acquiesced, at least, in the survival of some Middle Eastern autocracies, which has precipitated the invasion of Iraq, and whose default position is set at support for Israel in the Palestinian conflict. The power of the relatively free Arab media such as Al Jazeera and Al Arabiya is underestimated. Consider the American reaction to the contractors whose bodies were hung from a bridge. And then consider the impact of seeing deaths of Arabs--not just twisted metal and burned out cars but injured and dead people--in graphic detail every night on television.

A third elephant is the attitude of European society towards Turkish accession to the Union, as well as towards Muslim immigration and citizenship. These elephants, to mix metaphors, are brewing a perfect terrorism storm, one that should lead Canadian governments to extra circumspection in the policy choices they make on issues impacting the Middle East. These elephants pose great danger to people in the region they inhabit and to the rest of us far beyond the region, as recent events in Toronto suggest.

Considering the diversity and the intractability of the root causes, and the significance of the elephants, it is not immediately obvious whether greater consensus is achievable in the coming decade and, if so, how. However, remaining silent about these elephants or, worse, encouraging them will likely prove increasingly risky in the coming years. A principled, circumspect, made-in-Canada foreign policy in these increasingly fraught circumstances will serve both our interests and our values.

Speaking of Elephants—the US National Security Strategy

It is not possible to talk about the world in the coming decade without talking about American foreign policy. 9/11 shocked Americans, and Washington responded in 2002 with a new US National Security Strategy, which has recently been updated. Much of the strategy is readily acceptable, in fact commendable; much of it could have been written in other capitals, including in Ottawa.

The strategy’s problem lies, of course, in its preventive posture and the intent it expresses to predominate in perpetuity. Pre-emption is not prohibited by Article 51 of the UN Charter and is foreseen under customary international law. Prevention, however, is not. The difference is not just legalistic hair splitting. Pre-emption is acceptable only if it meets rigorous tests as regards the immediacy of the threat and the capability and intent of an adversary to do harm. In his new book, the One Percent Solution, Ron
Suskind argues that some senior officials in the current US administration believe that after 9/11 mere suspicion of malevolent intent is enough to justify military prevention.

In addition to prevention, the National Security Strategy expresses the intent to predominate indefinitely and to deter any challengers from emerging, a posture first seen in draft NSC guidance in 1992 in the George H.W. Bush administration, and rejected then. This thesis would, if carried to its logical conclusions, eventually generate major wars. Whether this theory will survive its skirmish with reality in Iraq and continue on into the next US Administration, only time will tell, but it seems unlikely. In the meantime, at least, prevention and predominance will remain recipes for record defence expenditures and the temptations that such capacity gives rise to

*The Issue of Nuclear Weapons: Will we save the NPT or Will It Be A Jungle Out There?*

President Bush and Senator Kerry readily agreed on one crucial issue during the 2004 presidential debates: the nexus of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction was the most important problem facing the United States, and the world. Since then, US political divisions have deepened and international progress on the arms control and disarmament (ACD) agenda has receded. The multilateral arms control process, already inadequate to the new challenges it faces, has become paralyzed in disagreement.

The 2005 World Summit, held in New York last September, achieved very few worthwhile outcomes (one notable exception being agreement on the Responsibility to Protect doctrine). But, in Secretary General Annan’s words, the most disgraceful of the Summit’s several failings was its inability to agree on any language at all on disarmament and non-proliferation.\(^6\)

Why did member States not live up to the world’s expectations at a time when the multilateral non-proliferation regimes were being tested by a small number of governments and when the fear that terrorists might acquire WMD was palpable?

Principally, it was because too many delegations had brought too much ideology with them to New York. The NWS appear to have excised the word “disarmament” from their negotiating vocabularies, a point made with respect to the US recently in the New York Times by Max Kampelman, the Reagan Administration’s

strategic arms reduction negotiator. In any case, whether deliberately or inadvertently, the strange bedfellows of current nuclear states and spoiler states succeeded in preventing any outcome on arms control.

The Non-Proliferation Treaty, the well-spring of arms control and disarmament law and norms, may itself be in serious jeopardy as a result, and no effective alternative is in sight. There are wide doctrinal disagreements between the nuclear weapons states, principally but not exclusively the United States, on the one hand and much of the rest of the NPT membership, that is to say, most of the rest of the world on the other. These disagreements go to the heart of the NPT bargains, primordially that of disarmament. Moreover, if the nexus of nuclear weapons and terrorists really is the principal policy concern, securing sensitive materials would be much easier in an NPT world descending to zero nuclear arms than in a free for all where multiple states maintained operational nuclear forces and large supporting infrastructures with little transparency and no international monitoring.

Some believe that disarmament has always been little more than a delusion on the part of the NNWS, a necessary pretext that there would one day be a quid for the quo they were giving in renouncing their own nuclear weapons aspirations, a quid on which the NWS never really intended to make good. Further, according to this view, too much effort has been paid to obtaining signatures on treaties and not enough on ensuring compliance with them. Arms control agreements and export controls had been ineffectual with respect to India, Pakistan, Israel, North Korea and, prospectively, Iran. They, also neither deterred nor much delayed A.Q. Khan in his activities. Counting on the effectiveness of treaty paper was equally delusional and downright dangerous.

The counter arguments derive from the famous observation by President Kennedy, the only President to face a full fledged nuclear crisis, that “We must abolish the weapons of war before they abolish us.” Those arguments hold that ridding the world of nuclear weapons will necessarily be a goal for the very long term but that it ought never to be abandoned, against the possible day that political attitudes and security perceptions with respect to nuclear weapons might change, and that near term action should be framed in such a way as not to preclude reaching the goal in the longer term.

Further, non-proliferation can only be achieved cooperatively; therefore treating the NNWS as inherently and eternally inferior entities is unlikely to serve the goals of compliance and enforcement, including with respect to terrorism. As for the effectiveness of the ACD regime, particularly the NPT, there
are fewer than half as many governments in 2005 with nuclear weapons programs as there had been in the Sixties and more countries have given up nuclear weapons than have illicitly acquired them.

Not insignificantly, each arms control agreement codifies an additional global norm and provides the international legal framework for opposing proliferation. Moreover, the NPT’s non-proliferation provisions are in any case not just a bargain between the NWS and the NNWS, but also a binding commitment among the NNWS themselves. They have undertaken to each other as well as to the NWS not to acquire nuclear weapons. These considerations are only made more complex by the alleged Iranian nuclear weapons program and by the deal negotiated by the United States and India.

Were Iran to develop nuclear weapons, a “political chain reaction” could well follow, involving Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Turkey, at least. It could very well be the beginning of the end of the NPT, and potentially of the world as we know it. The dangers inherent in North Korea’s nuclear program could produce a similar chain reaction. The India-US deal may be equally momentous. As the NPT and Nuclear Supplier Group regulations preclude nuclear trade with non-signatories, a special dispensation for India would have to be given.

Some argue that that would only be a welcome acknowledgment of reality. Others counter that, if Iran gets nuclear weapons and the India deal establishes a new double standard, how realistic would it be to expect other near nuclear weapons states to forbear forever from developing their own arsenals? Once the NPT starts to unravel, its collapse could be sudden and catastrophic. Then it really would become “a jungle out there”, a jungle full of well-armed inhabitants.

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Interdependence,

*Climate Change and Energy Demand*

Climate change is another policy area where consensus is scarce. Even at Kyoto, all countries were not prepared to assume common commitments. The developing countries stoutly resisted making contributions to emissions reductions, on the grounds that greenhouse gases were cumulative and that the
The bulk of these gases had been emitted by the richer countries over a period of time stretching all the way back to the industrial revolution.

The richer countries argued in turn that little effective progress could be made if the major Third World emitters, especially India and China, did not act to constrain their burgeoning emissions. Both sides had a point and the saw-off was agreement on a differentiated response, particularly differentiated in time, The richer countries would go first (the 2012-16 calendar periods) and the poorer countries would join in afterwards (in the 2017-2020 time frame). Since the US election in 2000, the Bush administration has rejected the treaty and the attachment of some other signatories to the Protocol has loosened, including apparently Ottawa’s. We will have to do something if we are to survive and merely hoping for a technological *dues ex machina* is not a policy. Leadership by governments, in harmony with environmentally aware industry, is indispensable. However endangered the Protocol has become; the phenomenon of climate change persists, with potentially devastating consequences, especially in the Third World.

During the 1990s, an average of 200 million people from developing countries per year were affected by climate-related disasters, eroding the capacities of entire communities to improve their livelihoods, setting back the fight against poverty. Since then, the global population has continued to grow, apparently inexorably. By 2020, i.e., less than 15 years out from now, the population of the planet is expected to reach nearly 7.6 billion. That will be an increase of about 1.1 billion people in fifteen years. China’s population is expected to reach 1,423,939 in the same time frame, up from 1,315,844, an increase of 108 million people. India’s population is expected to reach 1,332,032 in 2015, up about 230 million people. This growth is bound to have major impacts on the climate.7

While it is true that in the advanced economies, it has been possible to break the link between economic growth and energy dependency and that energy growth has grown more slowly, it has grown nonetheless. The demand for energy in India and China is only going to increase as their respective rates of development accelerate and their populations increase. By 2012, just three key countries plan to add 850 new coal-fired plants. These plants in China, India, and the United States are expected to emit as much as an extra 2.7 billion tons of carbon dioxide.8

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8 (according to a Monitor analysis of power-plant construction data.) *Christian Science Monitor*?
In contrast, countries that have undertaken reductions commitments under Kyoto are only supposed to have cut their CO2 emissions by 483 million tons by that year. By 2030 the number of automobiles in the world will increase by 50%. In 20 years the world will consume 40% more oil than it does today. It is predicted that global temperatures in 2100 will be 5.8°C warmer than they were in 1990. This will make the Earth warmer than it has been in 50 million years.

During the last one hundred years the global temperature has warmed by an average of 0.6°C. The current pace of sea-level rise is three times the historical rate, and appears to be accelerating. The Arctic ice pack has lost an area the size of Texas and Arizona combined since the mid-1970's. In fact, 98 percent of the world’s mountain glaciers are melting.

I risk boring you with all these statistics because they tell a powerful story. Preventing further climate change and adapting to it is no longer a question for the future, but an imperative now to avoid new economic and human disasters, which would disproportionately affect developing countries and vulnerable populations in those nations.

Technology will be part of the response, of course both as regards carbon-derived energy and more non-conventional sources. It is evident that substantially greater recourse will be had to nuclear power. India has a flourishing and largely indigenous nuclear power program and by some estimates expects to have 20,000 MWe nuclear capacity on line by 2020. China has apparently announced plans to build 30 new reactors by 2020- enough to generate twice the capacity of the Three Gorges Dam. A study in 2003 by a blue-ribbon American commission headed by former CIA director John Deutch, concludes that by 2050 China could require the equivalent of 200 full-scale nuclear plants. A team of Chinese scientists advising the Beijing leadership is said to have put the figure even higher: 300 gigawatts of nuclear output, not much less than the 350 gigawatts produced worldwide today.

All of this raises enormously difficult questions, some old some new. How crucial is nuclear energy to climate stability and energy security? Absent nuclear energy, how would we manage the extraordinary impact on the climate of inevitable increased fossils fuels use? Is nuclear energy safe and what are we

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9 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency “Global Warming-Climate Change,” available at http://yosemite.epa.gov/OAR/globalwarming.nsf/content/ClimateTrendsTemperature.html
12 Fang Yan, “China’s new power plants short-term solution for major energy crisis,” AFXN News Limited June 4, 2004
going to do with waste that remains dangerous for a quarter of a million years. That’s along time to keep
signs standing saying “Danger, Don’t Dig Here”?

In a world in which the nexus of nuclear weapons and terrorism is the sum of all fears, what will have to
be done to safeguard sensitive materials? What about the impact on proliferation? What should we do about
the nuclear fuel cycle and enrichment and reprocessing? Are there international governance refinements
that will help us to manage this potentially gargantuan complex of problems effectively?

International Governance

The United Nations

Under this heading, I will focus on the UN although the IFI’s, the WTO, NATO and several other
organizations suffer from similar, mostly age-generated problems and are simultaneously trying to transform
themselves.

I will make three main points: First, that the United Nations has served us better than most people
realize, whatever its critics might say, especially in the development and promotion of international law and
treaties, Second, that the UN has manifestly not kept up fully with the times, and needs renovation. Third,
that, the disappointments of last fall’s UN summit notwithstanding, the UN has in fact made numerous and
far-reaching innovations.

The world’s aspirations for the United Nations have exceeded the organization’s grasp but it has,
nevertheless, served us reasonably well in the intervening period, far better than its critics realize or admit.
Despite the Cold War, the UN gave birth to a body of international law that, among other things,
progressively stigmatized aggression and created a strong norm against it. That norm against aggression
came ultimately to be more respected than not and, in the process, enhanced the authority of the Charter.

Certainly, the prevention of World War III owed a lot to nuclear deterrence and collective defence
through NATO. But bloody as the world has been in the last 60 years, it would have been a much worse
place without the UN. According to the report of the UN Secretary General’s High Level Panel on UN
reform, there were fewer inter-state wars in the second half of the 20th century than in the first half, despite
a nearly four-fold increase in the number of states. While perusal of the international media might suggest
otherwise, according to the University of British Columbia’s Human Security Report, between 1992 and 2003 the number of armed conflicts dropped by 40%.\(^\text{13}\)

The number of wars—the most deadly category of armed conflict—declined even more sharply. The Report argues that the single most compelling explanation for these changes is found in the unprecedented upsurge of international activism, spearheaded by the UN, which took place in the wake of the Cold War. The UN has initiated numerous conflict prevention initiatives and has been much more ready since the Cold War to authorize its members to use force to stop internal conflicts. From 1945 until 1989, the end of the Cold war, there were 13 UN military operations.

Since then, there have been 42 military interventions under UN auspices; and the UN’s annual peacekeeping budget has grown to over $5 billion.\(^\text{14}\) More broadly, the UN has helped the world to feed its hungry, shelter its dispossessed, minister to its sick and educate its children. UNICEF has helped inoculate 100’s of millions of children against childhood diseases. The UNHCR protected 19 million refugees last year and scores of millions more over the years.\(^\text{15}\) The World Food Programme helped 113 million people in 2004 alone.\(^\text{16}\) The UN Mine Action Service has assisted states party to the Ottawa Treaty in their destruction of 38.3 million landmines.\(^\text{17}\) More mundanely, the UN has: regulated the world’s air travel, coordinated its mail services, overseen its patents system, regulated its shipping, and apportioned its electromagnetic spectrum, among many other unsung but necessary tasks.

Nevertheless, sixty years is a long time in the lives of institutions, as it is in the lives of people (god knows). The vicissitudes of time have taken their toll and the UN has not lived up to all of our expectations. In fact, it must be said that there have been serious disappointments, e.g., the ECOSOC which became lost in the ideologies of the Cold War and North-South dialectics and, consequently, has never validated the hopes of the Third World; and the composition of the Security Council, protected from change by the veto, which raises questions of legitimacy.

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Worse have been the conscience-shocking failures of the UN in Cambodia, the Congo, and the Balkans, which have left indelible stains on the soul of the world body. In Rwanda, even as 800,000 people were being systematically slaughtered, the Security Council played legal word-games about genocide, preferring to talk of “acts of genocide”, splitting hairs in order not to trigger the voluntarily accepted obligation under the Genocide Convention to intervene in the slaughter, while the “genocidaires” were literally, not figuratively, splitting heads. What prospects do ordinary people have when UN member states, especially its most powerful members, retreat into the complexities of sovereignty, ethnicity, religion, regional politics and economic interest and fail to act? Now it is Darfur that has been subject to Security Council dithering, while millions have been expelled from their homes and thousands upon thousands have died.

Some governments are just plain oblivious to the UN’s weaknesses, or indifferent to them, trusting to fate to fix them. Others would just forsake the UN altogether and look to their own strengths in a dangerous age. The first course would condemn the UN to an existence increasingly on the periphery of humanity’s vast need. The second course would condemn the world to repeat history in infinitely more dangerous circumstances. It is just plain foolish now to throw out the international rule book. Now is the time, in a single super power era, to reinforce the rules of the road, and encourage the development of a culture of law, rather than myopically expect the next superpower to eschew exceptionalism.

The wiser course is to adapt the UN so that it serves us better now and safeguards our common future. Two lessons from last fall’s summit seem clear enough by now. First, absent the calamity of a world war, which provided the incentive to create the UN in the first place, attempts at across-the-board transformations of the institution are unlikely to succeed. Second, the membership will, nevertheless, agree to innovations if they are well thought out, targeted on issues on which a consensus can be created, and actively but patiently promoted by governments and civil society.

That is precisely what happened with respect to the Canadian-commissioned, and -championed, report the Responsibility to Protect, which was perhaps the most promising innovation adopted in New York last September. Other outcomes of the Summit are important, for example, the creation of the Peacebuilding Commission, and the new Human Rights Council. Iran’s attendance at the first meeting of the Council notwithstanding, funding of the office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights will be doubled.

An extensive international criminal justice system is developing under UN auspices. The four ad hoc courts established to prosecute major crimes the ICTY, the ICTR and the Cambodia and Sierra Leone
hybrid courts, constitute a major innovation, found nowhere in the Charter. The cases of alleged perpetrators of major crimes against the innocents of Darfur have, also, been referred to the ICC by the UN Security Council, an irony missed by no one, including the current administration of the United States. The UN has even been asked to take over a criminal investigation in a member country—the case of the former President of Lebanon, Hariri.

The UN has, also, been innovative in its relationships with business, working with Bill Gates and pharmaceutical companies to develop private-public partnerships on HIV-AIDS and other major killer diseases. Perhaps the most visible recent UN innovation has been the creation of the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. That office coordinated the massive international relief response to the December, 2004, Asian Tsunami. It has managed the international responses to the massive earthquake in Pakistan last year, to the current earthquake in Indonesia and to the food shortages in Darfur and Mali. So, from counter-terrorism treaties, to human rights conventions, to the support of democracy and promotion of the rule of law to coordinating disaster relief to fostering sustainable development, to rebuilding states emerging from conflict, it is clear that the UN has taken very significant strides into the 21st Century, despite all the anxiety about the UN on the part of its believers and all the deprecations of the UN on the part of its critics.

I am not suggesting that all is well at Turtle bay. Last Fall’s summit revealed how little consensus there is on some crucial issues facing the organization. For some, especially the United States, the point of it all is security, especially security in an age of terrorism. For the poorer countries, the meaning of security is very different. For them the main issue is economic development and raising the standards of living, education and health of the poor. Partly as a consequence, there are several important missing pieces in the reform puzzle. Notably absent is agreement on criteria to govern the use of force.

**Conclusion**

I have focused on three major points that I hope you will have found relevant to your understanding of Canada, and of Canada’s place in the world. I have hinted at some possible future courses of Canadian policy over the coming decade. I have argued that: the world is deeply divided on crucial issues; that events
are conspiring to create “perfect diplomatic storms”; and that our international institutions require reinforcing if we are to weather these storms.

It is trite but true that if the UN did not exist we would have to invent it—if in conditions short of generalized war we could generate the political will and vision to do so.

Thank You