Notes for a Presentation

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on New Dangers, New Vulnerabilities

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Check Against Delivery

1) <u>Introduction</u>

I have been asked to discuss international affairs in light of the efforts of NATO countries to transform the Alliance to meet the political and military challenges they face in the 21st Century. Given the US role in the world, it is not possible to canvas international relations without talking about US foreign policy. And it is not possible to talk about US foreign policy without risking offending someone. I know that Canadians are sensitive about criticism from foreigners, and that goes double for criticism from the neighbours. At the same time, frankness is fundamental to developing consensus on the steps to take. So I will be frank but I will, also, try to bear these natural sensitivities in mind, and apologize in advance for any hurt feelings. Criticism I will offer on

European and Canadian policies might help to establish a balance.

For reasons of time, my presentation is going to have to be more assertive than reasoned, and more impressionistic than detailed, or comprehensive. What I will try to do is look broadly at the rest of the world and leave drilling deeper to the excellent people who will follow me. I will confine myself to a few pertinent comments on a few issues.

NATO transformation is happening in a very difficult environment. Transformation has to cope with factors external to the Alliance and internal to it. The external factors include the rising tide of Muslim anger towards the West, especially towards the United States,

which Bin Laden and other Islamist extremists are only too happy to try to stoke and exploit, the failure of states and the dangers failed states present to their own citizens (e.g., Sudan) and to us (e.g., Afghanistan), the inadequate responses of multilateral organizations, from the UN to the IMF to the World Bank to the WTO to NATO, itself, to the imperatives of the times, and the rapid emergence of new economic and, increasingly, military powers. I am tempted to add "the re-ordering of international economic power in the wake of the resolution at some point of growing US trade and payments imbalances", and, also, "climate change", to the list but the latter two are a bit beyond what I take to be the mandate I have been given, although they are relevant.

The endogenous factors are self-generated and include foreign policies of member countries, pre-eminently US policies, including the emphasis in the National Security Strategy on prevention (described inaccurately as pre-emption, which entails much more demanding tests before being triggered) and on perpetual pre-eminence, which is a prescription for vast defence spending and the de-stabilization that can follow, disagreements among allies and with others over controlling weapons of mass destruction, especially nuclear weapons, disagreement on effective responses to terrorism, and last but hardly least complex, sometimes destructive attitudes towards Islamic countries and Muslims. The internal factors are going to be much harder to overcome than the external factors.

Complicating Alliance transformation are two linked challenges--- the absence of consensus in the world at large about common dangers and the absence of consensus among NATO countries about what the role of NATO and the EU should be. For some, especially for Americans, the War on Terror is a real war. For others, it's a metaphor, or even just a tactic, albeit a heinous tactic. A war on a tactic cannot be won.

On this fundamental point, there is no consensus among allies. Nor has there been much consensus on the requisite policy responses. In the absence of a common existential threat, disagreement becomes affordable and unity of purpose becomes evasive.

Views of countries beyond NATO are even less concentric. Where you stand famously depends on where you sit. Or, in the case of "new dangers and new vulnerabilities", who and what you fear depends on who and where you are. Danger and vulnerability look different if you live in Kandahar or Copenhagen, or Nyala, Najaf or Nablus -- or New York, where I lived on 9/11, or Norfolk, where the world must loom particularly ominously for many people.

There are common fears that run through everyone's experience, of course, but the differences are enormous and there is little international consensus on what constitutes the priority danger and less sense of shared fate. Small arms and light weapons killed at least 300,000 people in 2004, predominantly in the

poorer countries. (source, Keith Krause, director of the Geneva-based small arms survey project). Pregnancy-related causes killed more than 500,000 women die of each year, 99% of them in the Third World. (source, the WHO), HIV-AIDS killed more than three million people last year, again overwhelmingly in the Third World, (source, UNAIDS), natural disasters killed 244,500 people last year, the vast majority in poorer countries. The potential exists for truly major catastrophes to happen. There are about a dozen cities worldwide with populations greater than 8 million situated along major earthquake belts or tropical cyclone tracks, mostly in the Third World. (source, the ProVention consortium). It is not surprising, therefore, in these circumstances that people in the poorer countries regard terrorism, especially terrorism

directed at rich countries, as a secondary priority to them, at best. The presumption, therefore, that there is any international consensus on a hierarchy of threat and especially that what threatens "us", the West, merits priority treatment, is a delusion. As has been very evident in recent efforts to reform the UN, there is no agreement on a hierarchy of threats and, worse, the countries of "North" and "South" have been virtually indifferent to each other's insecurities. Do the views of the rest of the world matter? Increasingly, they do. Secretary General de Jaap has argued that if NATO members want to continue safeguarding their values, they cannot continue to view the North Atlantic area in isolation from the rest of the world. The lesson of the last 10 years or so is that events in far away places, ranging from state failure to HIV-AIDS to avian flu,

can have enormous impacts on an increasingly integrated world.

It is worth recalling, in this light, the report of the High Level panel appointed by Secretary General Kofi Annan to advise the UN membership on Threats, Challenges and Change. The elder statesmen who wrote the report came from most of the existing and emerging major military powers from around the world, including all five permanent members of the UN Security Council. The US member was the widely respected former National Security Advisor to President George H. W. Bush, General Brent Scowcroft. The report was remarkable for the consensus it was able to achieve– all its members endorsed the outcome – and significant for its

comprehensiveness and its insights. The panel saw six

clusters of threats with which it said the world had to be

concerned, now and in the decades ahead. They were,

in order,

- economic and social threats including poverty, infectious disease and environmental degradation

- interstate conflict

- internal conflict, including civil war, genocide and other large scale atrocities

- nuclear, radiological, chemical and biological weapons

- terrorism

- and transnational organized crime.

Not surprisingly, given the vast and varied experience of its authors, that list is standing up well. The issues on today's conference agenda are mostly on that list somewhere, although today's topics are more specifically geared to a western audience,

specifically to a security-savvy western audience, Wehrkunde, to use the apt German term.

What is significant is that the High Level panel stressed prevention, not in the military sense of action against a presumed emerging danger,

But in the statesmanship sense, of the world's leaders coming together to act early, decisively and collectively against all of these threats.

To prevent conflict, not to trigger conflict.

The panel headed its list with economic threats because its members saw economic development as the indispensable foundation of a collective security system that takes prevention seriously.

And because they saw economic development as a complementary security strategy to enhanced military capacity.

Whether you agree with that perspective or not, and I do agree with it, it does have the virtue of aligning the interests of rich and poor.

Development saves lives in the poorer countries as it lowers infant mortality rates, increases education levels, raises employment levels, reduces the prevalence and significance of small arms and diminishes intrastate conflict.

Third World development increases security for the West by diminishing the number of lawless havens in which international terrorism can be and sometimes is incubated.

It, also, strengthens Third World public administrations that otherwise strain to cope with modern challenges of interest to us as well as them, such as preventing the incubation of pandemics, for example, Ebola, SARS and the next mutant bird flu,

any one of which is potentially not much more than one airline flight away for many of us,

as the people of Toronto found out the hard way a couple of years ago.

Yet there are very few western countries in which the balance between overseas aid and military budgets recognizes the reciprocal character of these strategic policy instruments.

Instead, foreign aid and military are often seen as scarcely related policy fields, one for doing things that are nice and the other for doing things that are

necessary, not as the complementary instruments they actually are.

It is as if domestically in our countries, police budgets got the lion's share of the available money, and health and education were just nice-to-do's.

To paraphrase Andrew Bacevich of Boston University, a Vietnam veteran and the author of "The Militarization of America", when it comes to funding diplomacy and foreign aid, parsimony reigns.

He was talking about the US government but his remarks apply in practice if not in scale to most western governments, (mine included).

(In Canada's case, by the way, I have been advocating more military spending and more foreign aid spending, both, as well as a better balance between them.

And it looks like our new government is cognizant of the need for all three.)

In any case, foreign policy stove-piping and imbalances strike me as unwise, expensive and, ultimately, dangerous.

More ought to be done about Third World poverty, disease and internal conflict even if there were no strategic case for doing so—but the strategic case is

compelling and comparatively cost-effective at the margin.

Consider the turnaround in Indonesian attitudes towards the United States that American Tsunami relief achieved.

The point is that in thinking about transformation, military spending needs to be re-considered in terms of both marginal bang-for-the-security-buck and opportunity costs.

2) New Dangers and New Vulnerabilities

Arms Control and Disarmament

Addressing and redressing the enormous disparities between rich and poor is a necessary but not sufficient policy response to the new dangers and vulnerabilities the west faces.

One of those incipient dangers comes from the unraveling consensus on the place of arms control and disarmament.

As candidate Kerry and President Bush agreed during the 2004 debates, <u>WMD proliferation</u> is the most important problem a President faces.

9/11 may or may not have changed everything, but it <u>has</u> demonstrated that the prospect of terrorists

getting access to nuclear weapons presents a major new
concern.

Countering the proliferation of nuclear weapons, in
particular preventing their acquisition by terrorist
groups and locking down existing stockpiles, becomes a
new top priority, or should.

The Nunn-Lugar cooperative Threat Reduction
Program and the more recent G8 Global Partnership
strike me as extraordinarily far-sighted statesmanship
in this regard.

[[Since 9/11, the policy emphasis seems to be more
focused on compliance and counter-proliferation than

on the promotion and preservation of treaties and norms

Washington seems to have concluded that the existing arms control and disarmament regime is inadequate in the face of the dangers of nuclear proliferation (see the memorandum from Secretary Rumsfeld to Secretary O'Neill, as reported in "The Price of Loyalty"),

that multilateral mechanisms to avoid the spread of weapons are ineffectual and, equally bad, that they constrain American freedom of action,

that paradoxically regional considerations

(relations with India, partly as a counterweight to

China) trump proliferation risks

and, finally, and most controversial,

that the danger of proliferation arises not from the

unparalleled destructive power of the weapons

themselves but from the malevolent nature of certain of

the governments that would possess them,

an idea reminiscent of the well-known National

Rifle Association dictum.

That logic, and the appeal of acquiring allies to

contain a presumed expansive China, made it possible

to negotiate a nuclear cooperation agreement with

India,

a country that had given itself nuclear weapons in

defiance of the international community

and to muster international support to prevent

Iran from doing the same thing.

Few governments want to see Iran have the bomb

but it is not obvious that double standards and threats

are going to work, particularly if insecurity is a prime

motive for Iran, it probably is.]]

The 2005 World Summit, held in New York last September, was disappointing in its chequered results on UN reform.

But, in Secretary General Annan's unusually frank assessment, the most "disgraceful" of the Summit's failings was its inability to agree on any language at all on non-proliferation and disarmament.

Why did member States not live up to the world's expectations at a time when the fear of terrorists acquiring WMD seemed so urgent?

Principally, it was because member States simply did not have the political will to accommodate each other to achieve progress.

Too many delegations had brought too much ideology with them.

There were doctrinal disagreements between the nuclear weapons states, principally but not exclusively the United States, on the one hand

and much of the rest of the NPT membership, that is to say, most of the rest of the world on the other.

These disagreements continue, and go to the heart of the NPT bargains, primordially that of disarmament.

Some believe that disarmament has always been little more than a delusion on the part of the Non-Nuclear Weapons states (NNWS),

a necessary pretext that they would one day get this quid for the quo they were giving in renouncing their own nuclear weapons aspirations,

a quid that all concerned knew the NWS never really intended to honour.

In this light, everyone would be better off just to drop the pretence.

Moreover, the NPT's non-proliferation undertakings were in any case not just a bargain

between the NWS and the NNWS, but also a binding commitment among the NNWS themselves.

They had, undertaken <u>to each other</u> as well as to the NWS not to acquire nuclear weapons, so the issue was not exclusively the nuclear states' obligations under Article 6.

Further, arms control agreements had been insufficient to stop Israel, India, Pakistan, probably North Korea and, prospectively, Iran.

Nor did they deter or much delay A.Q. Khan in his nuclear marketing activities.

Counting on their effectiveness was equal parts delusional and dangerous.

The counter arguments derive from the famous observation by President Kennedy, the only President to face a full fledged nuclear crisis,

that "We must abolish the weapons of war before they abolish us."

The weapons, themselves, are the problem.

As for the disarmament bargain in the NPT, all signatories recognize that ridding the world of nuclear weapons is necessarily a very long term goal

but that one that should never be abandoned,

against the possible day that political attitudes and security perceptions in the NWS towards nuclear weapons might change.

The very existence of a longer term goal frames near term decisions in such a way as not to prejudice the possibility of one day reaching the goal.

Further, non-proliferation can only be achieved cooperatively

Treating the NNWS as inherently and eternally inferior entities, therefore, is unlikely to serve the near

term goals of compliance and enforcement with existing treaties.

Compliance is crucial to preventing weapons from falling into the wrong hands and it cannot be readily coerced.

Nor by the way is threatening to use nuclear weapons against Iran likely either to make Teheran more cooperative or to persuade many third parties, especially Third World parties, to help out.

Max Kampelman who headed the US delegation to the nuclear and space talks in Geneva under President Reagan, summarized the issue in yesterday's New York Times when he called for idealism as well as realism in

US policy and urged that the goal of abolishing nuclear weapons not be abandoned.

Terror

The other part of the nexus, terror, is simple in its brutal effects but complex in its components and its susceptibility to solutions.

Terrorist motivations range from overthrowing the international system (radical Islamists), to creating a state theocracy, to overthrowing a given government, to secession from an existing state, to resisting occupation, to changing a social order, and beyond.

Conflating these motives diminishes consensus.

Disaggregating terrorist groups according to their particular motives, and then devising motive-specific counter-terrorism means seems more likely to be availing than lumping simply them all together.

Further, conflating all terrorist groups into one terrorist phenomenon can jeopardize international and domestic support by bringing all manner of legitimate and illegitimate counter-terrorism purposes under one banner.

Police cooperation, intelligence sharing and, ultimately, military power are indispensable but there is

also an equal need at least for up-stream policies that drain grievance of its power and that offer alternatives to militancy.

Considering the diversity and complexity of root causes, it is not surprising that governments have not been especially effective in addressing them.

It has been easier to reach for the hammer.

Part of the problem is the sheer complexity of the "causes", including:

- poverty and falling standards of living in the Muslim world;

- young male unemployment in the Middle East and South Asia

- **the pervasiveness of globalization and the encroachment of Western values, culture and power;**

- **extremist religious ideologies based on radical interpretations of Islam;**

- **weak, failing or failed states;**

- **repressive regimes;**

- **unresolved conflicts, particularly the Israel-Palestine conflict, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Chechnya; and**

- **Western, especially US foreign policy, particularly its default support for Israel and its alleged biases against Muslims and support for undemocratic Arab regimes.**

Islam

1) **US foreign policy**

- **Iraq**

- **Israel**   **}war on Islam**

- **Iran**

2) **EU domestic policy**

- **Marginalization of immigrants**

- **Double standards towards Turkey**

Radicalization of 1.2 billion Muslims

- **1% = 1.3 million militants**

- **.1% =120,000 militants**

Conclusion

**To quote Walt Kelly's old comic strip character Pogo,,
in implementing transformation, we have met the
enemy and he is us.**

**If NATO is going to be transformed, the member states
are going to have to transform themselves.
They are going to have to find a renewed sense of
shared fate and possibility.**

**Otherwise, the alliance will reflect our potentially
shrinking common ground**

Thank You.

I)   Conclusion

The good news, according to the Human Security Report produced by the Liu Centre of the University of British Columbia, current major problems notwithstanding, the world has made progress since 1945.

There were fewer inter-state wars in the second half of the 20th century than in the first half, despite a nearly four-fold increase in the number of states,

and they were less lethal.

International wars, now only a small minority of all conflicts, have been in steady decline for a much longer period, as have military coups and the average number of people killed per conflict per year.

The number of armed conflicts around the world has declined by more than 40% since the early 1990s

The dollar value of major international arms transfers fell by 33% between 1990 and 2003

The average number of battle-deaths per conflict per year—the best measure of the deadliness of warfare—has been falling dramatically albeit unevenly since the 1950s.

The period since the end of World War II is the longest interval of uninterrupted peace between the major powers in hundreds of years.

In 1963 there were 25 coups and attempted coups around the world, the highest number in the post–World War II period.

In 2004 there were only 10 coup attempts—a 60% decline. All of them failed.

International terrorism is the only form of political violence that appears to be getting worse, but even there the data are contested.

First of all, transformation of how we think about
our security, and how we use the Alliance. I have just
described the differences between the security
environment of my student days, and the threats we
face today which are global in nature. A clear
geographic delineation of these threats is simply no
longer possible.

(notable exceptions include the endorsement of the
Responsibility to Protect doctrine, the Peace-Building
Commission and the new Human Rights Council).

II) **Overview**

Secretary Reid is right, of course, that many
reforms are needed but, at a time when new potential

superpowers although obviously in need of further

updating for the 21st century, as UK Secretary of State

for Defence, John Reid has recently argued.

are emerging in the Third World,

I believe he would agree that it makes a lot of sense

to proceed circumspectly and cooperatively.

Just throwing out the rules of the road that the

world has lived by relatively successfully for the past 60

years

and reverting to power politics

looks like historical amnesia.

Where the UN did make progress and where it will have a major bearing on NATO thinking is the adoption of the Doctrine of the Responsibility to Protect.

It holds***